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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION, INC.,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) Civil Action File No. 2008 CV 156905
)
)
PLACE COLLEGIATE DEVELOPMENT,)
)
LLC, CECIL M. PHILLIPS, and
)
MANHATTAN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants,
)

-------------------------))
MANHATTAN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
Counter/Cross and
Third Party-Plaintiff,

v.
KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION, INC., PLACE
COLLEGIATE DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
and CECIL M. PHILLIPS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~

)
)
Counter/Cross-Defendants,
)
)
and
)
)
CPO PLASTERING, INC., ST. PAUL
)
FIRE AND MARINE INS. CO., TC
)
DRYWALL AND PLASTER, INC., THE )
GUARANTEE CO. OF NORTH
)
AMERICA USA, ATLANTA DRYWALL )
AND ACOUSTICS, INC., AMERICAN
)
SOUTHERN INS. CO., METRO
)
WATERPROOFING, INC. and
)
WESTERN SURETY CO.,
)
)
Third-Party Defendants.
)

-------------------------)

FILED IN OFFICE'
SEP 1 7 2009

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the
counterclaim of Defendant Manhattan Construction Company and on Defendant
Manhattan Construction Company's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court
has reviewed the briefs of the parties filed in connection with these motions and
rules as follows:
Background
This case arises out of a dispute regarding the construction of dormitories
at Kennesaw State University, and involves allegations of breach of contract and
negligent construction. Plaintiff Kennesaw State University Foundation, Inc.
("KSUF") entered into a contract with Defendant Place Collegiate Development,
LLC ("Place") to develop and build student housing at the university. Place also
entered into a contract with Manhattan Construction Company ("Manhattan") to
build the dormitories. The contract between KSUF and Place assigns the
warranties between Place and its subcontractors (including Manhattan) to KSUF.
There were problems with the construction of the buildings which resulted in this
lawsuit. The complaint alleges breach of contract, breach of implied warranty
and negligent construction against Manhattan. Manhattan's counterclaim alleges
breach of contract and unjust enrichment against KSUF.
Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Manhattan does not oppose
KSUF's motion to dismiss its counterclaim with regard to the claim for unjust
enrichment, and so the Court does not consider the arguments made in support
of the motion on that count of the counterclaim.

KSUF argues that it is entitled to dismissal of Manhattan's contractual
claims because there exists no privity between those parties. Manhattan argues
that the assignment of its warranties by Place to KSUF at least creates a
question offact as to the existence of a contract between it and KSUF. In its
motion to dismiss Manhattan contends that Place's alleged initial material breach
of its contract with Manhattan bars KSUF, as Place's assignee, from a claim of
breach of contract against Manhattan. Alternatively, Place contends that the lack
of privity between it and KSUF precludes an action for breach of contract and
breach of implied warranty against it by KSUF. The central issue created by
these arguments is the import and legal consequences of the assignment.
With regard to its motion to dismiss the count for negligent construction,
Manhattan argues that the only duty it owed was to Place, and thus it cannot be
held liable for breach of duty to KSUF. Manhattan contends that the fact that its
contract with Place was executed before the KSUF/Place contract was executed
is proof that its only relationship in this construction venture was with Place and
that it had no independent relationship with KSUF.
Under Georgia law a subcontractor has no contractual relationship, no
privity, with an owner with whom it has no contract. Hussey, Gay & Bell v.
Georgia Ports Authority, 204 Ga. App. 504 (1992). Georgia law does allow
parties to assign all or portions of their contractual rights to third parties.
D.C.G.A. § 44-12-22. Manhattan does not allege that Place assigned its entire
contract to KSUF, and does not dispute KSUF's contention that only the
warranties were assigned. There is no evidence that KSUF intended to be

bound by any of the contractual obligations of Place simply by accepting the
assignment of Manhattan's warranties from Place. See High Point Sprinkler Co.
of Atlanta v. George Hyman Construction Co., 164 Ga. App. 706 (1982). The
Court concludes, therefore, that no privity and therefore no contractual
obligations existed between KSUF and Manhattan. See Kennesaw Flooring, Inc.
v. Rector, 291 Ga. App. 704 (2008).
The Court is not persuaded by Manhattan's arguments that discovery is
necessary for the development of evidence to support its contractual claims
because there is no writing before the Court to show that KSUF assumed Place's
obligations to Manhattan. On the contrary, the contract between KSUF and
Place, which is before the Court is clear and unambiguous as to what contractual
rights and obligations are assigned. That contract is thirty-one pages in length
and covers the many facets of the contractual relationship between KSUF and
Place. One provision of that contract assigns warranties given to Place by its
subcontractors to KSUF as the owner of the property. Manhattan has not shown
that KSUF expressly or impliedly assumed Place's obligations to Manhattan or
that KSUF manifested any intention to be bound by Place's obligations. Central
of Ga. R. Co. v. Woolfolk Chem. Works, Ltd, 122 Ga. App. 789 (1970).
With regard to Manhattan's claim that Place's alleged initial material
breach of its contract with Manhattan should be attributed to KSUF, the Court
finds that it is unable to consider this argument in a motion to dismiss because it
of necessity relies on extrinsic evidence, and not merely on the allegations in the
complaint, and is thus not appropriate for a motion to dismiss pursuant to

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). For the same reason, the Court cannot consider
Manhattan's claim of res judicata without considering evidence, not before it, as
to whether the defects KSUF complains of were litigated in prior arbitration
between Manhattan and Place.
Georgia law is clear that a negligent construction claim does not depend
on privity of contract between the parties. '" [A] negligent construction claim
arises not from a breach of contract claim but from the breach of a duty implied
by law to perform the work in accordance with industry standards.''' Schofield
Interior Contractors, Inc. v. Standard Building Co., 293 Ga. App. 812, 814 (2008).
See also Stancliff v. Brown and Webb Builders, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 224 (2002).
When the allegations in a complaint (or counterclaim) disclose with
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of
provable facts, and when the movant establishes that the claimant could not
possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint (or
counterclaim) sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought, a dismissal should
be granted. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498 (1997).
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the
counterclaim of Defendant Manhattan Construction Company is hereby
GRANTED, and Manhattan's motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED this

(1

day of September, 2009.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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